Showing posts with label John Howard. Show all posts
Showing posts with label John Howard. Show all posts

Thursday, November 20, 2008

Generals and Diggers saved the day in Timor

The fighting quality of the Aussie digger that saved the day in East Timor not Desk Warriors.
Private Carl "The Enforcer" Lloyd, Alpha Company, 4RAR, East Timor, 2001.
Photo by Sasha Uzunov.


On Line Opinion - Australia's e-journal of social and political debate.

http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=8179&page=0


GENERALS AND DIGGERS SAVED THE DAY IN TIMOR

by Sasha Uzunov

Influential Defence expert and former Fairfax journalist, Hugh White, has revealed that Australia’s involvement in East Timor succeeded because of the Indonesian military’s (TNI) reluctance to fight a full scale war; this is partly true.


"Interfet succeeded as well as it did largely because Habibie and the TNI allowed it to succeed," White said.


Interfet was the name of the 1999 Australian led mission to restore order after East Timor declared its independence from 24 years of harsh Indonesian occupation. BJ Habibie was the then President of Indonesia who permitted East Timor to hold a UN supervised referendum.


White, who was the deputy secretary (strategy and intelligence) in the Defence Department, and the mastermind behind the Interfet mission, fails to mention four big factors behind the success.


They are: the brilliant leadership of two Australian Army generals, Frank Hickling and Interfet Commander Peter Cosgrove, the calibre of the Special Forces, the SASR, and the ordinary digger when confronted by the pro-Indonesian militia groups.


There was a secret war in East Timor fought by Indonesian Special Forces: Kopassus. The objective was to inflict as many casualties on Australians and New Zealanders in the hope that their respective governments would withdraw.


The Howard government at the time deliberately used the Army’s elite Special Forces unit, SASR (Special Air Service Regiment), to do most of the fighting in East Timor: fighting which should have been performed by the infantry.


The political logic was that the public and media would accept SASR casualties rather than a 19-year-old infantryman, fresh out of home or from a small country town.


But political logic does not necessarily make good military sense and vice-versa. In East Timor the pro-Indonesian militia tried to inflict as many casualties as possible on our infantry units, including battalions made up of many reserve/part time soldiers, in the hope that Australia would withdraw.


White is quiet on the issue of throwing reservists into the deep end after the regular army had been gutted; it was only the quality of the ordinary Australian soldier which stopped a disaster from happening.


It was General Frank Hickling’s foresight in 1998 as the Chief of Army that should be acknowledged. He issued his famous “back to basics” order that all Australian soldiers, regular and reserve, must sharpen their war fighting skills. He was concerned at the rundown of the Army.


Ironically, it was White and another defence expert, Paul Dibb, who were the prime movers in cutting back Army numbers in the late 1980s. Neither have ever served in uniform.


Respected Brigadier Jim Wallace, former Special Forces Commander, wrote in 2003:


"Unfortunately, Australian defence policy has been mainly wrong for the whole of this period. Even after we committed troops to East Timor, Professor Paul Dibb, the policy's chief architect, was standing in front of parliamentary committees vowing that Australia would not be conducting what he called "expeditionary" operations out of the region. This was despite a series of major UN deployments over many years to places as far a field as Rwanda and Somalia. Afghanistan and Iraq have hopefully now discredited this logic.


"At the same time, Dr Hugh White was arguing in initial drafts for the 2000 white paper to reduce the size of our army to about 19,000, on the basis that, like Professor Dibb, he didn't see the Government needing options for deployment out of the region, particularly for sending the army. The result has been an incredible demand on the dedication and professionalism of our special forces as they have again been thrown into the breach that our supposedly expert defence planners couldn't predict."


War is a serious business and it needs to be left to the professionals, not arm chair generals.

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Links:
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,24591926-5013871,00.html
Howard fear for Diggers in Timor

John Lyons, November 03, 2008
The Australian newspaper

Friday, October 24, 2008

WAR ON TERROR LEADER QUIET ABOUT LACK OF WAR SERVICE

Australia's Leader on the War on Terror won't discuss his lack of war service in Vietnam (1962-72)



Still waiting for a reply…after 15 months...
ASIO Spy boss wont reveal why he didn’t volunteer to fight in Vietnam…
WAR ON TERROR LEADER WON’T DISCUSS HIS LACK OF WAR SERVICE


By Sasha Uzunov


Mr Paul O’Sullivan, Director General of Australia’s internal spy agency, ASIO, and one of the Leaders in the War on Terror has refused to respond to questions put to him over a year ago as to why he did not volunteer to fight in Vietnam during the 1960s.


Mr Sullivan, was asked in a letter dated 20 July 2007:


“Mr O’Sullivan, as Director General of ASIO, you are one of the leaders in the War against Terrorism. Looking at your impressive resume in the publication of Who’s Who in Australia, there is no mention of you having served our nation in the military or police or security services but in Foreign Affairs.


“Sir, according to the entry it says you were born in 1948. Could you explain why you did not volunteer to fight in the War against Communism in South Vietnam (1962-72)? You may have missed out on the National Service scheme but could have joined the Australia Regular Army, Navy or Air force.


“I look forward to your response.”


As yet Australia’s Leader on the War of Terror has not been forthcoming about his lack of war service unlike his then boss, Attorney General Phillip Ruddock, who responded to the same questions within a couple of months.


Mr O’Sullivan was born on 3 February 1948 and missed out on the selective National Service Ballot then in operation from 1964-72 for all 20 year old Australian males. However, he could have still joined the Regular Army.


The ASIO boss joined Foreign Affairs in 1971 as a diplomat and eventually ended up a Security Advisor to then Prime Minister John Howard. He became Director General of ASIO on 21 July 2005.


(end)

Tuesday, September 23, 2008

RUDD THE REAL McCOY ON DEFENCE?

ADF photo: PM Rudd meets the troops


IS RUDD THE REAL McCOY ON DEFENCE?



By Sasha Uzunov
Copyright 2008



In recent weeks we have witnessed the Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, deliver sermons from the mount which have struck a chord with the defence community. Is the PM the long awaited Messiah, the Real McCoy?



First there was his government’s decision to award medals to the Long Tan heroes from the Vietnam War after a 42 year wait; then there was talk of changing the Nelson-Howard military doctrine on Afghanistan by allowing our infantry soldiers to take over the fighting from the Special Forces; and announcing that Australia had to strengthen its defence forces to counter an arms race in our Pacific-Asia region.



Whatever PM Rudd’s true motivation is, you have hand it to him he is a very clever strategic/foreign affairs operator that many pundits have not given him the credit. Let me explain by drawing a comparison with Bob Hawke, another ALP Prime Minister (1983-91), also with messianic tendencies.



Hawke was known as the great conciliator whose claim to fame was his ability to bring opposing groups to the negotiating tables and hammer out a deal. During his Prime Ministership he brought in British academic Professor Paul Dibb and ex-Fairfax journalist Hugh White. Their brief was to transform the defence department with a number or reports, Defence White Papers and so on. Instead we ended up with a mess that took over a decade to bring under some form of control.



Mr Bruce Haigh, a former diplomat revealed during an interview with SBS TV’s Dateline program on 27-9-2000 that:



“Defence is the department that’s divided amongst itself, as far as I can gather, and there are certain people inside Defence who’ve taken a certain line for a long period of time - the Paul Dibb line, if you like, which is high-tech, US-alliance - and you’ve got others who are saying, "No. We’ve got the situation to the north- we need to have more people in uniform, we need to have them trained, we need to have night-vision equipment provided for them. “… the Australian Army can see what needs to be done, but many of the civilian Defence personnel, who’ve built their careers on playing up to this particular line, are arguing the other case, and feeling increasingly isolated, because they are not facing reality. That’s the problem.”



Respected Brigadier Jim Wallace, former Special Forces Commander, wrote in 2003:

“Unfortunately, Australian defence policy has been mainly wrong for the whole of this period. Even after we committed troops to East Timor, Professor Paul Dibb, the policy's chief architect, was standing in front of parliamentary committees vowing that Australia would not be conducting what he called "expeditionary" operations out of the region. This was despite a series of major UN deployments over many years to places as far a field as Rwanda and Somalia. Afghanistan and Iraq have hopefully now discredited this logic.



“At the same time, Dr Hugh White was arguing in initial drafts for the 2000 white paper to reduce the size of our army to about 19,000, on the basis that, like Professor Dibb, he didn't see the Government needing options for deployment out of the region, particularly for sending the army. The result has been an incredible demand on the dedication and professionalism of our special forces as they have again been thrown into the breach that our supposedly expert defence planners couldn't predict.”



Professor Dibb’s response was to make the snide remark on the ABC TV Lateline program on July 11, 2002 that Wallace was a “retired brigadier.”



In contrast to Dibb’s retired brigadier sentiment, current PM Rudd has taken on board his government “retired colonel” Iron Mike Kelly, as parliamentary undersecretary on defence.



Furthermore, the PM told a RSL National congress last week: “…the first responsibility of government is the security of the nation. And it follows therefore that government has a particular responsibility towards those who have worn the nation's uniform. Because there is in my view no higher calling than to wear the uniform of Australia.”



To counter the possible Asia-Pacific arms race and the emergence of China, he said:“Our armed forces must be equipped to deal with the emerging security environment That is why the Government has already committed to making sure we stay ahead of the game by extending the real growth of the defence budget by 3 per cent per annum to 2017-18.”



Taxpayers, veterans, and serving defence personnel have heard it all before from politicians promising heaven and earth. Time will tell if Rudd can deliver on his pledges. One thing is for sure, those who have served in uniform will never again be dismissed as taking no part in the defence debate.



(end)

Links:

http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/04/19/1050172796796.html
Brigadier Jim Wallace -
Iraq lesson can help correct defence policy
April 20 2003

http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/11/25/1038173691409.html
Dr Gerard Henderson
Defence policy war heats up
November 26 2002

Tuesday, September 09, 2008


photo credit: ADF


"FAILED" NELSON-HOWARD DOCTRINE ON AFGHANISTAN?
By Sasha Uzunov
copyright 2008

The political and military fallout of the Taliban ambush attack on Australian soldiers in Afghanistan can be traced back to the failure of 2006 Nelson-Howard doctrine on the Afghanistan war.

Nine Australian Special Forces soldiers in Afghanistan were recently wounded in some of the heaviest fighting seen so far. If I was the current Defence Minister, Joel Fitzgibbon, I would be raising questions in the Federal Parliament over the previous government's handling of the war.

SAS WITHDRAWAL- 2006

As the then Defence Minister, Dr Brendan Nelson, together with the Prime Minister John Howard made the decision to withdraw our Special Forces troops from Afghanistan in November 2006, giving the Taliban the breathing space it needed to re-organise.

Then Dr Nelson denied that there was a rift with our coalition partners the Dutch which was causing a delay in restoring stability to our Area of Operations in the Oruzgan province. But later read the Dutch the riot act if they pulled out of the mission.

“The consequences of a Dutch withdrawal, if we can't find another partner, is that we would be far too exposed to continue,” Dr Nelson said in August 2007.

German expert finds the "smoking gun" --Dutch-Aussie rift over mission

When I was in Afghanistan in May 2007, I bumped into a well respected Ulrich Ladurner, who is the foreign editor of the German weekly Die Zeit and co-author with Gerow von Randow of The Iranian Bomb. He said he had been to the Dutch-Australian base at Tarin Kowt in Oruzgan.

"The Dutch and Australians are making a big effort but it is too slow in bringing stability to the province," Mr Ladurner said."'The local people are not happy with the progress made. It is still not safe. The region is still wild." In the vacuum left by the Special Forces departure, the Taliban were roaming into other provinces such as Helmand, run by the British, and Kandahar, run by the Canadians.

KEVIN 07--Rudd was right on Afghanistan

Later, the Special Forces were sent back to Afghanistan in mid 2007, an admission that a mistake had been made. In the irony of ironies, the then Opposition Leader and now Prime Minister Kevin Rudd said the previous reduction of Australian troops in Afghanistan was an absolute mistake that let Osama bin Laden, leader of the terror group Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, off the hook. In response to the criticism of withdrawing the SAS, the then Prime Minister John Howard said:

"But we will not win it without renewed and increased effort and that is why we are playing our part. It's important, in dealing with the Taliban, not to be too passive."

NELSON-HOWARD MILITARY DOCTRINE: contradiction?

To top that off, a legacy of the Nelson-Howard military doctrine has the Special Forces doing most of the fighting, because of the fear of casualties to our regular infantry units. The long term effect could be burn out of our Special Forces. But the irony is if we withdraw our SF units and do not replace them with infantry units, then the pressure on Taliban is eased. It is one contradictory military doctrine, to say the least.

SF BURN OUT?

"Twice now we have had to deploy special forces in Afghanistan and twice now we have had to withdraw them because they are too tired," said Neil James, of think tank the Australian Defence Association in October 2006.

The highly respected Brigadier Jeff Sengelman DSC CSC, deputy commander of Special Operations, revealed the SAS had faced problems with recruiting and retaining soldiers but put a positive spin by also saying that it did not affect its operational capability.

The Australian Defence Force Chief, Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston, was on the money when he said days ago that the increase in Taliban activity against Australian troops in Afghanistan was a last attempt to inflict casualties before the northern winter set in, bringing a close to the traditional war season for another year. But let us take a closer look and read between the lines, if we can.

"It was an ambush. My understanding is it was gunfire and rocket-propelled grenades," Brigadier Robert Dawson, Defence PR, said.

Brigadier Dawson said the Taliban were fighting hard to repel Coalition incursions into their heartland areas. "Some of the operations which ISAF are conducting are in areas where Coalition soldiers have not been before," he said. "I think we can expect more heavy fighting." (Herald Sun, 4 Sept 2008).

Our diggers were operating against the Taliban in the strategic Chora valley north east of Tarin Kowt.

Okay, an ambush means that the enemy knows you are coming and are waiting for you. Obviously the Taliban’s intelligence gathering is working excellently and it must be getting some form of support from the local population. However, what is distressing is the statement that our troops are operating in areas they have not been before.

BREATHING SPACE FOR THE TALIBAN?

We have been in Afghanistan since 2001 that is 7 years so far and have not been able to still secure our AO. Is this because of the Nelson-Howard "breathing space" given to the Taliban in late 2006? In the military when a senior commander makes a mistake he accepts full responsibility and falls on his sword. Under our Westminster system of Parliamentary democracy, the buck stops with the politicians.

MORE FORCE?

Victory in Afghanistan can be achieved through political means backed up by the surgical use of force. When you give the local people, security, clean water, education and hope, they will turn against the Taliban.

More force does not translate into winning.

(end)

----------------------------------------------

LINKS:

http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,24301037-7583,00.html
Let the infantry do its job
Greg Sheridan, Foreign editor September 06, 2008

THE wounding of nine Australian soldiers in a Taliban ambush on Tuesday night is not only the biggest single combat casualty incident since Vietnam. It also tells us important things about the Rudd Government, about the nature of the Australian Army, about the dreadful
----------------
Sasha Uzunov story - 10 July 2008 http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,23995986-5000117,00.html
New options to blunt Taliban Sasha Uzunov
July 10, 2008 12:00am

The SASR and 4RAR (Commando) are our two Specials Forces units and are a precision tool to be used sparingly, not as a blunt instrument. Australian infantry soldiers have recently expressed their dissatisfaction at being kept away from the sharp end in Afghanistan. And the question must be asked: how long can the new Rudd Government use the SAS Regiment and 4RAR (Commando) in an infantry role before they become worn out? When will the Government allow our infantry to do the job they have trained for?

In 1999 the Howard government used the army's elite Special Forces unit, the SAS, to do most of the fighting in East Timor, which should have been performed by the infantry. The political logic was that the public and media would accept SAS casualties rather than a young infantryman, fresh out of home or from a small country town. That political priority seems to remain. But political logic does not necessarily make good military sense, and vice-versa.

In East Timor, the pro-Indonesian militia tried to inflict as many casualties as possible on our infantry units, including battalions made up of many reserve soldiers, in the hope that Australia would withdraw. The moral of the story is, no matter how hard the Australian Government tries to insulate our infantry from combat by using the SAS, the unexpected happens.
---------------------------------------------------------------
- August 31, 2007.
The Australian
Nelson warns Dutch on Afghan pullout
Dennis Shanahan August 31, 2007

BRENDAN Nelson has warned Dutch MPs that a decision to remove their troops from southern Afghanistan could lead to the withdrawal of Australia's military personnel based alongside the Dutch in Oruzgan province.

The Defence Minister met 12 Dutch parliamentarians in the Afghanistan capital of Kabul this week after meeting President Hamid Karzai and Australian commanders.The Dutch parliament is considering withdrawing the country's troops from Oruzgan province following a series of combat deaths and rising public concern in The Netherlands about the wisdom of the fight against theTaliban.

The Australian engineers and special forces - part of a 970-strong Australian contingent in Afghanistan - have had increased contact with Taliban fighters in recent weeks, with small arms fire being directed at police checkpoints being built by Australian soldiers to protect local Afghani police.The checkpoints are being used to control traffic around the Oruzgan town of Tarin Kowt and to monitor movements by Taliban insurgents.

Apart from the small arms fire near the Camp Holland base at Tarin Kowt, Australian soldiers on patrol have made contact more frequently with Taliban fighters in the nearby mountains and hills.Two weeks ago, Australian forces had a decisive victory against local Taliban forces with a US air strike killing 18 Taliban leaders, including one of their most senior commanders in Afghanistan.

The Dutch forces provide vital helicopter air cover for the Australian troops working and patrolling around Tarin Kowt, and Australian commanders fear they would not be able to operate without it.The Dutch parliamentary committee members met Dr Nelson and the Chief of Defence Forces, Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston, at Kabul Airport.

Dr Nelson told The Australian that the Dutch MPs were informed that Australia was against any decision to reduce the Dutch presence in the region."We are not in a position to increase our numbers in Afghanistan and we won't and can't take the lead position in Tarin Kowt," the minister told the MPs.

"There are Australian soldiers who owe their lives to the Dutch Apache helicopters and they play a critical role."The consequences of a Dutch withdrawal, if we can't find another partner, is that we would be far too exposed to continue."The Dutch have 2200 troops at the Camp Holland base at Tarin Kowt and have suffered the deaths of six soldiers, including one on the day the parliamentary delegation was visiting Kabul to assess the situation in Afghanistan.

---------------------------------------------------
http://newmatilda.com/2007/06/06/news-front
Afghanistan 6 Jun 2007
News from the Front By Sasha Uzunov

Australian journalist Sasha Uzunov reports from the Afghan front

The Forgotten War Sometimes it takes an outsider to tell us the most uncomfortable truths.
Last week, Defence Minister Dr Brendan Nelson took a swipe at critics who question the pace at which Australian troops are securing their designated province in Afghanistan, saying:

Any suggestion Australian troops are not pulling their weight in southern Afghanistan is beneath contempt. Australia is steadfastly committed to Uruzgan as shown by the recent decision to deploy a Special Operations Task Group of approximately 300 people to the region. However, the recent decision to send Special Forces back to Uruzgan could also be read as a tacit admission that not all is well with the mission. (Who was the genius who decided to remove our Special Forces soldiers from Afghanistan late last year?)

When I asked the Defence Minister if a rift had developed between Australian troops and the Dutch Army engineers they are serving alongside, over who was doing the most to secure Uruzgan, Nelson would not comment.

The controversy was sparked by prominent German journalist, Ulrich Ladurner, who claimed, in an interview he gave to me at Kabul airport on 14 May, that both the Australians and Dutch were being slow in establishing security in the province. Ladurner, who is the foreign editor of the German weekly Die Zeit and co-author with Gero von Randow of The Iranian Bomb, spent weeks as an embedded journalist with Dutch Army engineers in Uruzgan Province at the Tarin Kowt base they share with Australian troops.

'The Dutch and Australians are making a big effort but it is too slow in bringing stability to the province,' Ladurner said. 'The local people are not happy with the progress made. It is still not safe. The region is still wild.'

One of the reasons it takes a non-Australian to provide this insider's view of the situation around Tarin Kowt is the Defence Department's obsession with controlling media access to our troops.
--------------------
Ulrich Ladurner interview at Kabul Airport, 14 May 2007

Ulrich Ladurner on Afghanistan Australian and Dutch troops were making slow progress despite their best ...

Interview can be seen on:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PPSc9hP6qA4

Monday, September 08, 2008

DEFENCE MINISTER MAKES SENSE ON AFGHANISTAN

photo credit: ADF
Australian Prime Minister John Howard (1996-2007) with the troops


DEFENCE MINISTER MAKES SENSE ON AFGHANISTAN
by Sasha Uzunov

The current Australian Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon has tacitly acknowledged the wearing down of our Special Forces, because of the failed Nelson-Howard military doctrine, in the Afghanistan War.


But we must remember two things:


One, we must be prepared to accept casualties of young infantry soldiers, grunts.
And, secondly, more force does not necessarily mean success. The answer to winning in Afghanistan involves a combined political and military strategy.


BACKGROUND:
Sasha Uzunov story - 10 July 2008
The Herald Sun


http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,23995986-5000117,00.html

New options to blunt Taliban Sasha Uzunov July 10, 2008 12:00am


The SASR and 4RAR (Commando) are our two Specials Forces units and are a precision tool to be used sparingly, not as a blunt instrument. Australian infantry soldiers have recently expressed their dissatisfaction at being kept away from the sharp end in Afghanistan. And the question must be asked: how long can the new Rudd Government use the SAS Regiment and 4RAR (Commando) in an infantry role before they become worn out? When will the Government allow our infantry to do the job they have trained for?


In 1999 the Howard government used the army's elite Special Forces unit, the SAS, to do most of the fighting in East Timor, which should have been performed by the infantry. The political logic was that the public and media would accept SAS casualties rather than a young infantryman, fresh out of home or from a small country town. That political priority seems to remain. But political logic does not necessarily make good military sense, and vice-versa.


In East Timor, the pro-Indonesian militia tried to inflict as many casualties as possible on our infantry units, including battalions made up of many reserve soldiers, in the hope that Australia would withdraw. The moral of the story is, no matter how hard the Australian Government tries to insulate our infantry from combat by using the SAS, the unexpected happens...
-----------------------------------------------------
courtesy of The Aussie Digger

website/forum ...http://theaussiedigger.com/TheAussieDiggerForum/

quoting ABC NEWS
8 September 2008


Fitzgibbon signals possible infantry combat role Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon has not ruled out using Australian infantry in combat for the first time since the Vietnam war.


All Australia's offensive combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have been carried out by elite SAS and commando units, but there are calls within the Army for regular infantry units to be given some of the combat burden.


The issue was raised in the autumn issue of the Australian Army Journal when two serving officers wrote that keeping the infantry out of the front line was having a negative effect on morale.


Mr Fitzgibbon says more than 1,000 Australian soldiers are currently in Afghanistan and he does not intend to increase that number.


But he says he will consider using the infantry in combat roles for the first time to ease the load on the Special Operations Task Group (SOTG).


"It is true that our Special Operations Task group - that is, our special forces people - have had to sustain rotations for a long, long time now," he said.


"We'll constantly look at how we can take the pressure off our special forces by constantly reviewing and potentially reconfiguring our commitment."
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2005 UZUNOV STORY ON THE OVER USE OF THE SAS
(extract):
The Herald Sun newspaper


A grand political warrior
by Sasha Uzunov
21 January 2005


...Some have criticised General (Peter) Cosgrove on his over reliance on the SAS to do the fighting in East Timor that would normally have been taken up by the regular infantry.
But I think this criticism is unjustified.


Criticism should be aimed at the government of the day (Howard 1996-2007) and those at home squeamish about seeing a 19 year old lad away from home for the first time fighting a war. Better to send the SAS, whose identity cannot be revealed...


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UPCOMING ARTICLE--

TEAM UZUNOV EXAMINES THE 'FAILED' NELSON-HOWARD MILITARY DOCTRINE ON AFGHANISTAN.